Politik Transfer Fiskal dan Ketimpangan Kapasitas Daerah: Studi Komparatif Kabupaten Kaya Sumber Daya dan Kabupaten Bergantung Transfer

Abstract

This article examines how intergovernmental fiscal transfers shape local governance incentives in two contrasting types of Indonesian districts: resource-rich districts and transfer-dependent districts. Using a comparative secondary-data-based case study, this article analyzes fiscal decentralization, local revenue capacity, and institutional incentives in regional budgeting. The study argues that fiscal transfers do not merely finance local development; they also structure political incentives, administrative behavior, and accountability relations between central and local governments. Resource-rich districts may possess greater fiscal space but face risks of rent-seeking and weak expenditure discipline, while transfer-dependent districts often operate under narrower fiscal autonomy and stronger dependency on central allocation rules. The article’s novelty lies in conceptualizing fiscal decentralization as an incentive regime rather than merely a budgetary arrangement. The article contributes to politics and governance studies by showing how fiscal design shapes local political behavior, elite strategies, and public service outcomes. The findings suggest that fiscal reform should focus not only on allocation formulas but also on institutional incentives, transparency, and performance-based accountability.