Electoral Governance, Digital Disinformation, and Democratic Resilience: Comparative Institutional Analysis of Canada and Taiwan

Abstract

Digital disinformation has become a central governance challenge for contemporary democracies, affecting electoral integrity, public trust, institutional legitimacy, and national security. This article examines how political institutions shape democratic resilience against digital disinformation through a comparative analysis of Canada and Taiwan. Both cases are liberal democratic systems with advanced digital infrastructures, competitive elections, and high exposure to foreign information influence. Yet their institutional responses differ significantly. Canada relies on an independent electoral management model, federal coordination, platform regulation, and public communication mechanisms, while Taiwan employs a whole-of-society resilience model integrating government agencies, civil society fact-checking networks, digital participation platforms, and cybersecurity institutions. Using comparative governance analysis and democratic resilience theory, this study argues that electoral resilience depends not only on legal regulation or technological monitoring but on institutional trust, civic capacity, public communication, and adaptive coordination among state and non-state actors. The findings indicate that Canada’s model strengthens procedural neutrality and electoral administration credibility, whereas Taiwan’s model demonstrates stronger societal mobilization and rapid disinformation response capacity. The article contributes to governance scholarship by linking electoral institutions, digital governance, public trust, democratic participation, and sustainable political resilience in an era of hybrid information conflict.