Judicial Accountability, Democratic Resilience, and Constitutional Backsliding: ComparativeInstitutional Developments in Poland and South Korea, 2020–2026

Abstract

This annual review examines judicial accountability and constitutional resilience through a comparative
analysis of Poland and South Korea between 2020 and 2026. The article argues that contemporary judicial
governance has become a central arena in which democratic systems negotiate the relationship between
constitutional independence, institutional accountability, political contestation, and public legitimacy. Poland
and South Korea provide analytically significant comparative cases because both have experienced intense
conflict over courts, prosecutors, constitutional review, and executive power, yet their institutional
trajectories differ substantially. Poland illustrates how judicial reforms can become instruments of
constitutional backsliding when accountability language is used to weaken independence, discipline judges,
and restructure constitutional authority. South Korea demonstrates a more ambivalent pattern in which
judicial and prosecutorial accountability reforms have been linked to democratic consolidation, anticorruption politics, and institutional recalibration, while still generating concerns regarding politicization and
separation of powers. The findings show that judicial accountability strengthens constitutional democracy
only when embedded in institutional pluralism, transparent procedures, legal professionalism, and effective
safeguards against executive capture. The article contributes to contemporary public law scholarship by
conceptualizing judicial accountability as a dual-use constitutional mechanism capable of either reinforcing
or undermining democratic resilience depending on institutional design and political context.